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Abstract. In the last decade, several researchers have proposed theories of actual causation that 
make use of structural equations and directed graphs. Many of these researchers are committed 
to a widely-endorsed folk attribution desideratum (FAD), according to which an important 
constraint on the acceptability of a theory of actual causation is agreement between the 
deliverances of the theory with respect to specific cases and the reports of untutored individuals 
about those same cases. In the present article, we consider a small collection of related theories 
of actual causation: the purely structural theory developed in Halpern and Pearl (2005), and two 
theories that supplement the structural equations with considerations of defaults, typicality, and 
normality—Hitchcock (2007a) and Halpern and Hitchcock (2015). We argue that each of these 
three theories are meant to satisfy the FAD, then present empirical evidence that they fail to do 
so for several variations on a simple scenario from the literature. Drawing on the responsibility 
view of folk causal attributions suggested by Sytsma, Livengood, and Rose (2012), we conclude 
by offering a solution that allows the latter two theories to satisfy the FAD for these cases. The 
solution is to give up on concerns with typicality and focus on injunctive norms in 
supplementing the graphical modeling machinery. 
 
 
 
Imagine a trolley beginning its descent down a steep hill on a rainy night. Before it begins to 
move, the brake operator says to the conductor of the trolley, “The cable has come loose, so if 
we need to slow down on the descent, we will have to rely exclusively on the handbrake.” The 
conductor decides to proceed anyway. Halfway down the hill, the brake fails, and the out-of-
control trolley crashes. Suppose that the trolley would not have crashed if it had not been raining, 
that it would not have crashed if the conductor had taken time to reattach the cable, and that it 
would not have crashed if the conductor had decided not to proceed at all. If those are the facts of 
counterfactual dependence in this case, what caused the trolley to crash? This is a question about 
actual causation, a question about which factor(s) from amongst the host of possible factors 
brought about the crash in the circumstances that actually obtained. 
 Many researchers working on actual causation have taken questions like “Did the rain 
cause the trolley to crash?” to be questions about the deliverances of common sense or ordinary 
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intuition—what we’ll refer to as folk causal attributions.1 These researchers are committed to a 
folk attribution desideratum (FAD), according to which an important measure of the 
acceptability of a theory of actual causation is the agreement between its deliverances with 
regard to specific cases and folk causal attributions about those same cases.2  
Over the past decade, many of these same researchers have employed the technical 
machinery of graphical causal modeling to provide an account of actual causation. Early 
accounts, like that of Halpern and Pearl (2005), were purely structural in character. Empirical 
evidence suggests, however, that normative considerations have a notable effect on folk causal 
attributions, rendering purely structural accounts a poor fit for the FAD.3 Subsequent accounts, 
like those of Hitchcock (2007a) and Halpern and Hitchcock (2015), have fared better by 
supplementing the graphical modeling machinery with a distinction between default and deviant 
values of variables or with some consideration of normality.4 Following Halpern and Hitchcock 
(2015, 3) we’ll refer to such accounts collectively as DTN accounts (for defaults, typicality, and 
normality). 
 We hold that the shift toward DTN accounts moves theories of actual causation in the 
right direction for purposes of satisfying the FAD, and in this paper, we will provide new 
                                                 
1 We will restrict talk of “folk causal attributions” to judgments about causation in concrete cases, such as the trolley 
case given above. 
2 Some commitment to common sense, intuitions, or the like has been very common in work on the metaphysics of 
causation. Paul and Hall (2013) offer a notable dissent in their “Rule five,” which admonishes us not to enshrine 
intuitions. However, in fleshing out what they mean, they clearly state that they take intuitions to be valuable. “We 
think it is important to take intuitions very seriously, and we will do so throughout this book, paying special 
attention to places where our intuitions are in tension, since we take intuitions to be important guides to what we 
think we know about ontological structure, and the existence of said tensions indicate the need for further analysis. 
But intuitions must be used with care” (41). 
3 See Livengood and Sytsma (ms) for a recent line of evidence indicating that purely structural accounts fail to 
satisfy the FAD. 
4 See Danks (2016) and Livengood and Rose (2016) for overviews of graphical causal modeling and of experimental 
work on causal attribution, respectively. Sytsma and Livengood (2015) categorize work on causal attribution that is 
constrained by the FAD as part of a descriptive program in experimental philosophy. See Pearl (2000), Hitchcock 
(2001), Woodward (2003), Glymour and Wimberly (2007), and Halpern (2008) for applications of structural 
techniques to the problem of actual causation. See Hall (2007), Glymour et al. (2010), and Sytsma and Livengood 
(ms) for critical appraisals of these theories. 
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experimental evidence supporting that assessment. However, we will also present evidence that 
current DTN accounts fail to satisfy the FAD for some simple cases. We argue that the DTN 
accounts we consider fail to satisfy the FAD because they have not given sufficient priority to 
the role of injunctive norms in ordinary causal judgments. 
 Here is how we will proceed. In Section 1, we briefly describe three representative 
theories of actual causation. In Section 2, we note that the theories under consideration were 
meant to satisfy the FAD, apply the theories to Knobe’s (2006) Lauren and Jane case, and 
provide empirical evidence that the deliverances of the theories do not match folk causal 
attributions for that case. In Sections 3 and 4, we consider possible objections and buttress our 
initial findings with further empirical results. Finally, in Section 5, we offer a suggestion for 
modifying the accounts under consideration to better satisfy the FAD. 
 
1. Three Theories of Actual Causation 
To test current theories of actual causation against the FAD we need to determine both what the 
theories and what the folk say about concrete cases. To determine the former, we need to know 
how the technical machinery works. In this section we very briefly discuss the technical 
machinery for these three theories.  
 
1.1 Preliminaries 
The three theories we consider all make use of graphical causal models. For present purposes, a 
causal model is an ordered pair consisting of an ordered set V of variables and an ordered set E 
of functions such that for each variable V in V, there is a unique EV in E that determines the value 
of V given the values of the other variables in V. The functions in E are sometimes called 
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structural equations. It will sometimes be valuable to partition the set V into an ordered set U of 
exogenous variables, whose values are directly assigned, and an ordered set W of endogenous 
variables, whose values are determined by the structural equations once the values of the 
variables in U are given. We will use the term “context” to denote the ordered set u of values 
assigned to the exogenous variables.  
 A graphical causal model is a causal model together with a directed graph—called a 
causal graph—that represents the functional dependencies in the causal model. Variables in a 
causal model become vertices of the corresponding causal graph. For each variable V in V, there 
is a directed edge from X into V if and only if X appears as an independent variable (with non-
zero coefficient) in the structural equation EV. For example, the causal model M1 consisting of 
the set <A, B, C, D> of variables and the set <A = 1, B = (1 – A), C = B, D = B> of Boolean 
structural equations is represented by the causal graph in Figure 1. Let X → Y denote that there is 
a directed edge from X to Y. If X → Y, then we say that X is a parent of Y and that Y is a child of 
X. A path of length n ≥ 0 from Vi to Vj is a sequence S = <V(1), V(2), …, V(n+1)> of vertices such 
that Vi = V(1), Vj = V(n+1), and for every pair <V(k), V(k+1)> of vertices in S, V(k)  V(k+1). 
 
  Figure 1: Causal graph of causal model M1. 
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1.2 Halpern and Pearl’s Theory 
In order to articulate Halpern and Pearl’s theory, we need a small amount of additional notation. 
For any variable V in V, if v is a possible value for V, then call V = v a primitive event. Let φ 
denote a Boolean combination of primitive events, and let the expression V ← v denote that the 
variable V has been set or assigned to the value v. For distinct variables V1, …, Vn, an expression 
of the form [V1 ← v1, …, Vn ← vn] φ is called a basic causal formula.5 A causal formula is a 
Boolean combination of basic causal formulas. If a causal formula ψ is true relative to a model M 
and a context v, we write (M, v) ⊨ ψ. Finally, for an ordered set X of variables X1, …, Xn and an 
ordered set x of values x1, …, xn, let X = x denote the conjunction X1 = x1 ∧ … ∧ Xn = xn. 
 Halpern and Pearl offer the following account of actual causation (2005, 853).6 Say that 
the event X = x is an actual cause of the event ψ relative to M and v if and only if the following 
three conditions are all satisfied: 
AC1. (M, v) ⊨ X = x, and (M, v) ⊨ ψ. 
 
AC2. There is a partition of the endogenous variables W into sets A and B with X ⊆ A 
and settings x´ ≠ x and b´ (which may or may not be equal to the actual values b of B) 
such that if (M, v) ⊨ A = a for all A in A, then both of the following are satisfied: 
 
 (a) (M, v) ⊨ [X ← x´, B ← b´] ¬ψ. 
 (b) (M, v) ⊨ [X ← x´, B´ ← b´, A´ ← a] ψ.7 
 
 AC3. X is minimal in the sense that no subset of X satisfies both AC1 and AC2.8 
                                                 
5 Assuming that the vi terms are possible values for the variables appearing in the basic causal formula. 
6 Halpern and Pearl talk about causal formulas as events, writing that “we are using the word ‘event’ here in the 
standard sense of ‘set of possible worlds’ (as opposed to ‘transition between states of affairs’); essentially we are 
identifying events with propositions” (852, fn6). We will adopt their conventions here. 
7 The sets A´ and B´, which appear in condition (b), are subsets of A and B, respectively, and condition (b) must 
hold for all such subsets. 
8 In Section 5 of their paper, Halpern and Pearl introduce a slight modification of their theory, but the added 
complication makes no difference with respect to the cases we consider. Hence, we will be concerned only with the 
original theory. 
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Condition (AC1) says that the cause and the effect both occur. Condition (AC2) says (in 
condition a) that a cause must be a difference-maker in some possibly counterfactual 
circumstance and (in condition b) that a cause has to actually do some difference-making work 
in the imagined circumstance. Condition (AC3) ensures that events are not counted as causes just 
because they have parts that are causes. 
 In order to make claims about actual causation, Halpern and Pearl’s theory requires a 
causal model. In principle, the causal model can be discovered by appeal to experimental and 
statistical evidence. But in many cases like the ones we consider later on, the causal model is 
assumed to be obvious.9 
 
1.3 Hitchcock’s Theory 
Hitchcock’s theory consists of three parts: a causal model, a specification of the default values 
for the variables in the causal model, and a mathematical tool (TC).10 To state TC, we need two 
new technical notions—a causal network and a self-contained causal network. A causal network 
is a subset of variables in a graphical causal model that satisfy a specific graphical condition: 
 CN. Let <V, E> be a causal model, and let X, YV. The causal network connecting X to 
 Y in <V, E> is the set N   V that contains exactly X, Y and all variables Z in V lying on a 
 path from X to Y in <V, E>. (509) 
 
The notion of a self-contained causal network augments the graphical condition by appeal to the 
default values of the variables in the network:11 
                                                 
9 However, see Halpern and Hitchcock (2010), Halpern (2015), and Blanchard and Schaffer (forthcoming) for 
discussion of why one ought to be careful in constructing a causal model. 
10 When the conditions specified by TC are not satisfied, the theory is silent about the actual causes. In what 
follows, we will restrict attention to cases that satisfy the conditions required for Hitchcock’s theory to make actual 
causal attributions. 
11 Other authors, both within and without the graphical causal modeling tradition, have made use of a default/deviant 
distinction in order to try to answer questions about actual causation. For examples, see Hall (2007) and Halpern (2008). 
Blanchard and Schaffer (forthcoming) criticize the use of the default/deviant distinction in causal modeling. 
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 SCN. Let <V, E> be a causal model, and let X, YV. Let N   V be the causal network 
 connecting X to Y in <V, E>. Then the causal network N is self-contained if and only if 
 for all ZN, if Z has parents in N, then Z takes a default value when all of its parents in N 
 do (and its parents in V \ N take their actual values). (510) 
 
Suppose that the variables A, B, and C are all binary (0, 1), where zero is the default value. 
Consider the structural equation model M2 given by the Boolean equations A = 1, B = 1, and C = 
A   B. In the model, both networks NAC and NBC are self-contained, since C would equal zero 
(its default) if either A or B were set equal to zero (their default values).  
 
 
Figure 2: Causal graph for causal model M2. 
 
 
 With the notions of causal networks and default values of a variable in hand, Hitchcock 
produces TC, which says that in a self-contained network, counterfactual dependence of Y = y on 
X = x is both necessary and sufficient for X = x to count as an actual cause of Y = y. 
 TC. Let <V, E> be a causal model, let X, YV, and let X = x and Y = y. If the causal 
 network connecting X to Y in <V, E> is self-contained, then X = x is a token cause of  
 Y = y in <V, E> if and only if Y counterfactually depends upon X in <V, E>. (511) 
 
In other words, if the causal network connecting X to Y is self-contained, then X = x is an actual 
cause of Y = y if and only if for some non-actual value x* ≠ x of variable X, variable Y takes on 
some non-actual value y* ≠ y. 
 Not surprisingly, Hitchcock holds that the difference between the default state of a 
system and deviations from that default is an important component of a correct theory of actual 
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causation.12 The difference, he claims, is fairly straightforward in most cases, but it is difficult to 
state precisely. Nonetheless, he offers a number of rules of thumb for determining the default and 
deviant values for a given case. Roughly, the default state of a system is its natural state—the 
state the system is (usually) in unless something has been done to it: 
 As the name suggests, the default value of a variable is the one that we would expect in 
 the absence of any information about intervening causes. More specifically, there are 
 certain states of a system that are self-sustaining, that will persist in the absence of any 
 causes other than the presence of the state itself: the default assumption is that a system, 
 once it is in such a state, will persist in such a state. (2007a, 506)  
 
In contrast, deviant states of a system are those that diverge from its natural state, and the system 
reaching that state typically involves an intervening cause: 
 Temporary actions or events tend to be regarded as deviant outcomes. In the case of 
human actions, we tend to think of those states requiring voluntary bodily motion as 
deviants and those compatible with lack of motion as defaults. In addition, we typically 
feel that deviant outcomes are in need of explanation, whereas default outcomes are not 
necessarily in need of explanation. Frequently, but not always, my deviant values 
correspond to positive events, and defaults correspond to absences or omissions. (507) 
 
It should be clear from these descriptions that Hitchcock’s rules of thumbs do not offer a precise 
guide for determining default and deviant values for any given case. At the same time, the 
guidance he does offer needs to be taken seriously under threat of underdetermination. The 
danger is that by allowing the choice of default and deviant values to vary too widely, TC could 
be used to produce opposing causal attributions. That said, in what follows, we attempt to apply 
Hitchcock’s rules of thumb charitably.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 He is not alone. See Hall (2007) for another take on the notion of defaults. 
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1.4 Halpern and Hitchcock’s Theory 
At the beginning of their essay on “Cause and Norm,” Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) reflect on 
the problem of causal preemption and on attempts to handle the problem via broadly 
counterfactual approaches to actual causation: 
One promising line is to identify causation not with counterfactual dependence in the 
actual situation, but rather with counterfactual dependence in a certain kind of 
‘normalized’ version of the actual situation. This normalized situation is reached by 
replacing abnormal features of the actual situation with more normal alternatives. (589) 
 
Hitchcock and Knobe go on to argue that judgments of overall normality guide agents in 
choosing which counterfactuals to evaluate, and the choice of which counterfactuals to evaluate 
matters for causal attributions. 
 Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) make the role of normality in actual causation judgments 
precise by modifying condition AC2a in the Halpern and Pearl theory to require that the 
assignment of the values x´ to X and b´ to B in context v that makes ψ false yields a world that is 
at least as normal as the actual world. In order for an event to count as an actual cause of ψ, it 
cannot be strictly more normal than alternative events for which ψ is false. 
 The idea is best understood via an example. Consider the distinction between causes and 
background conditions.13 Suppose an arsonist sets a fire in an abandoned warehouse, burning it 
to the ground. If the arsonist had not set a fire, the warehouse would not have burned down. But 
also, if there had been no oxygen in or around the warehouse at that time, the warehouse would 
not have burned down. In terms of counterfactual dependence, the arsonist and the oxygen are on 
par. However, while we are inclined to say that the arsonist caused the warehouse to burn down, 
we are not inclined to say that the oxygen caused the warehouse to burn down. What explains the 
difference? Halpern and Hitchcock suggest that while the world in which the arsonist does not 
                                                 
13 This distinction is discussed in Section 7.3 of Halpern and Hitchcock (2015). 
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set a fire is more normal than the actual world (where she does), worlds in which there is no 
oxygen in the warehouse are clearly less normal than the actual world. In other circumstances, 
the presence of oxygen might count as a cause. If, for example, there is an oxygen leak in a 
vacuum chamber in a laboratory, the presence of oxygen might count as abnormal. 
Following Hitchcock and Knobe (2009), Halpern and Hitchcock note two senses of 
“normal,” writing: 
The word ‘normal’ is interestingly ambiguous. It seems to have both a descriptive and a 
prescriptive dimension. To say that something is normal in the descriptive sense is to say 
that it is the statistical mode or mean (or close to it). On the other hand, we often use the 
shorter form ‘norm’ in a more prescriptive sense. To conform with a norm is to follow a 
prescriptive rule. (429-430) 
 
And while they hold that “further empirical research should reveal in greater detail just what 
kinds of factors can influence judgments of actual causation” (432), they also make it clear that 
they expect both types of norms—what they term statistical norms and prescriptive norms—to 
play a role in assessing normality.14 In fact, they argue that “the different kinds of norm often 
serve as heuristic substitutes for one another” (430) and talk about “the extent to which we find it 
natural to glide between the different senses of ‘norm’” (431). As with the rules of thumb in 
Hitchcock (2007a), it should be rather clear that Halpern and Hitchcock do not offer a precise 
guide for assessing normality. Nonetheless, their suggestions are meant to put some constraints 
on assignment of norms (2015, 433), as is needed to avoid the specter of underdetermination.  
 
2. Lauren, Jane, the Theories, and the Folk 
Many researchers interested in actual causation are committed to the FAD, according to which 
the deliverances of a theory of actual causation are correct insofar as they agree with folk causal 
                                                 
14 Elsewhere we’ve referred to these under the labels of “descriptive norms” and “injunctive norms,” taking the latter 
to include both prescriptions and proscriptions. For present purposes, however, we’ll use Hitchcock and Knobe’s 
terminology. 
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attributions. And this includes the three theories discussed in the previous section, as is made 
clear in the supplemental materials for this article.  Accepting this, we want to know whether 
these theories satisfy the FAD. In this section, we test this for a test case due to Knobe (2006): 
Suppose that Lauren and Jane work at a company with a computer system that crashes if two or 
more people are logged in at the same time. The company knows how the system works and has 
instituted a policy governing how employees use the system. Lauren and Jane each log into the 
system and it crashes. In the circumstances, Lauren was permitted to log into the system, while 
Jane was not. 
 
2.1 What the Theories Say 
The simplest model that seems to capture the relevant details is one in which variables are 
specified for Lauren, Jane, and the state of the computer system (but see 3.1). Let L, J, and C be 
variables representing Lauren, Jane, and the computer system, respectively. The possible values 
of the variables L and J are “logs in” and “does not log in.” The possible values for C are 
“crashed” and “not crashed.” The equations assign values to both L and J directly. The variable 
C takes the value “crashed” if and only if both Lauren and Jane take the value “logs in.” Since L 
and J are both assigned the value “logs in,” C takes the value “crashed.” Structurally, the model 
is identical to M2 (see 1.3). 
 Taking Halpern and Pearl’s theory to make predictions about folk causal attributions, it 
predicts that when people are presented with the Lauren and Jane case they will say both that 
Lauren caused the system to crash and that Jane caused the system to crash. Hitchcock’s theory 
makes the same prediction if we take the default values for Lauren and Jane to be “does not log 
in” and the default value for the computer system to be “not-crashed.” We think these choices 
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follow from charitable application of Hitchcock’s rules of thumb. First, not logging into the 
computer system is a self-sustaining absence, while logging in is a temporary action, a positive 
event, and one requiring voluntary bodily motion. Second, while the computer system continuing 
to run is not an absence, it is self-sustaining in the sense that if a computer is running, we 
generally expect it to continue running unless something disrupts it. Treating the computer in this 
way is similar to the way Hitchcock treats being alive for an ordinary human (2007a, 506).  
Under some reasonable assumptions, Halpern and Hitchcock’s theory also predicts that 
people will say that both Lauren and Jane caused the crash. Starting with Jane, since she violates 
the company policy by logging in, it seems that a world in which she does not log in (with all 
else staying the same) is strictly more normal than the actual world. For Lauren, we think that it 
is most natural to say that her not logging in is neither more nor less normal than her logging in. 
Recall that in their discussion of normality, Halpern and Hitchcock distinguish between 
statistical norms and prescriptive norms. Let’s begin with prescriptive norms. Unlike Jane, 
Lauren is permitted to log in, so she does not violate a prescriptive norm by doing so. At the 
same time, being permitted to log in does not mean that she is required to do so and the story 
does not indicate that logging in is required for her usual work. As such, with regard to the 
prescriptive norm, it seems that Lauren not logging in is neither more nor less normal than 
Lauren logging in. Similarly for the statistical norm. The story does not specify that Lauren 
typically logs in, nor does it describe logging in as part of Lauren’s daily routine. If anything, we 
might expect that it is surely the case that logging in is more the exception than the rule for 
Lauren. Putting the norms together, it seems that Lauren not logging in is at least as normal as 
Lauren logging in.  
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Halpern and Hitchcock (2015, 436) consider the possibility of using normality orderings 
on worlds (called witnesses) that satisfy AC2a in order to grade or rank actual causes.15 Suppose 
that there are several witnesses that X = x is an actual cause of φ. Then we can consider the best 
witnesses, where a witness s is a best witness if there is no strictly more normal witness (i.e. 
there is no world that satisfies AC2a and is strictly more normal than s). Halpern and Hitchcock 
suggest ranking actual causes according to the relative normality of their best witnesses, and they 
go on to make the following empirical conjecture: 
We expect that someone’s willingness to judge that X = x is an actual cause of φ 
 increases as a function of the normality of the best witness for X = x in comparison with 
 the best witness for other candidate causes. Thus, we are less inclined to judge that X = x 
 is an actual cause of φ when there are other candidate causes of equal or higher rank 
 (436). 
 
One might try to explain some of our empirical results by ranking actual causes in this way (e.g., 
the results of Studies 1 and 2). We are not in position to fully evaluate the proposal, since 
Halpern and Hitchcock do not make any guesses about the degree to which ordinary attributions 
of actual causation might be affected by the relative normality of the best witnesses for some 
collection of actual causes. However, we think that some of our empirical results do not sit 
comfortably with the proposal (e.g., the results of Studies 9 and 10). 
 
2.2 What the Folk Say 
What do ordinary people say about Knobe’s Lauren and Jane case? To find out, we gave 
participants a vignette based on Knobe’s thought experiment.16 Participants were asked to 
indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed with each of the two claims below on a 7-point 
                                                 
15 We would like to thank an anonymous referee for reminding us about this part of Halpern and Hitchcock’s paper. 
16 The vignettes for each of the studies in this article are provided in the supplemental materials. 
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Likert scale anchored at 1 with “strongly disagree,” at 4 with “neutral,” and at 7 with “strongly 
agree” (this scale was used in all of the studies reported in this article): 
 1. Lauren caused the system to crash. 
 2. Jane caused the system to crash. 
 
As we expected, but in contrast to the causal attributions made by the theories, participants 
treated Lauren and Jane differently: they tended to say that Jane, but not Lauren, caused the 
system to crash.17, 18 In a follow-up study, we replicated the finding of our first study using a 
between-participants design.19 Each participant was given the same vignette as in our first study, 
but this time they were asked about just one of the two claims. Consistent with the results of our 
first study, participants tended to say that Jane, but not Lauren, caused the system to crash.20 The 
results of are shown in Figure 3. Accepting these results, the three theories fail to satisfy the 
FAD for the Lauren and Jane case.21 
 
                                                 
17 In all studies, responses were collected online through philosophicalpersonality.com; participants were native 
English speakers, 18 years of age or older, with at most minimal training in philosophy. Minimal training in 
philosophy was taken to exclude philosophy majors, those who have completed a degree with a major in philosophy, 
and those who have taken graduate-level courses in philosophy. 
18 N=72; 73.6% female, average age 34.6 years, ranging from 18-81 years old. In each study in this article we 
conducted one sample t-tests to compare the mean response for each claim to the neutral point of 4. Each test is one-
tailed unless specified otherwise. For Study 1, the mean response for Lauren was significantly below the neutral 
point (mean=2.42, sd=2.04, t=-6.59, p=3.35e-9) while the mean response for Jane was significantly above the neutral 
point (mean=5.21, sd=2.19, t=4.67, p=6.87e-6). 
19 We want to thank an anonymous referee from Review of Philosophy and Psychology for suggesting this addition. 
20 N=34, 35; 65.2% female, average age 30.1, ranging from 18-67. Lauren: mean=2.41, sd=1.71, t=-6.59, p=3.35e-9. 
Jane: mean=4.94, sd=2.29, t=4.67, p=6.87e-6. 
21 An anonymous referee expressed a generic worry about our interpretation of our results. After remarking that our 
analysis assumes that responses lower than the midpoint express the judgment that the target factor is not a cause, 
the referee urged that people selecting 2 or 3 on our scale might be intending to say that the factor is a cause but not 
a very strong cause. But the referee’s suggested interpretation of our data is implausible for two reasons. First, we 
explicitly asked participants to rate their level of agreement or disagreement with a statement, rather than asking 
them to rate the strength of a cause. Second, since we anchored 4 with the label “neutral” and 1 with “strongly 
disagree,” the most natural reading of responses would understand responses of 2 or 3 to be disagreement—though 
admittedly less strong disagreement—with the target statement. 
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Figure 3: Results for Studies 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
3. Objections and Replies 
 
Our first two studies present prima facie reason to think that the theories of actual causation 
considered here do not satisfy the FAD. We expect two basic kinds of objection. The first kind 
aims to defend both purely structural theories and DTN theories, the second kind only DTN 
theories. We consider the first category in this section and the second in Section 4. 
 
3.1 Objection 1: Wrong Causal Model 
As noted in Section 1, none of the theories we are considering offers much guidance with regard 
to selecting a causal model. In testing the theories, we chose the simplest model that captured 
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what we took to be the relevant details from the Lauren and Jane scenario. However, one might 
argue that the causal model we selected leaves out an important variable—the state of the 
computer system. Such a worry is especially pressing, since as pointed out by Halpern and 
Hitchcock (2010) and Halpern (2015), what a theory of actual causation says depends crucially 
on details about the causal model.  
Adding a fourth variable to the causal model to capture the state of the mainframe, 
however, does not change what Halpern and Pearl’s theory says about Lauren and Jane. Since 
the final state of the computer system still depends on what Lauren does and on what Jane does 
in the actual situation, Halpern and Pearl’s theory counts both of them as actual causes of the 
crash. And the same holds for the other two theories. So this objection on its own does not enable 
the theories to satisfy the FAD for the Lauren and Jane case. 
 
4.2 Objection 2: The Saliency of the Instability 
Although simply changing the causal model does not save the theories we are considering, one 
might charge that our studies did not adequately test folk causal attributions with regard to the 
updated causal model. Specifically, one might argue that the instability of the mainframe is the 
most salient causal factor in the Lauren and Jane case but that we downplayed the instability by 
not asking a question about it, potentially skewing participants’ responses for the statements 
about Lauren and Jane. 
 We tested the saliency objection in three ways. First, in Study 3, we gave participants the 
same probe used in our first study, but we also asked participants to rate how strongly they 
agreed or disagreed with a claim about the mainframe. In contrast to the causal attributions made 
by the theories, but in line with the results of our previous studies, participants tended to disagree 
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with the claim that Lauren caused the system to crash but tended to agree with the claim that 
Jane caused the system to crash. In addition, they tended to agree with the claim that the 
mainframe caused the system to crash.22 Second, in Study 4 we extended the between-
participants design from our second study by asking participants a question about the mainframe. 
Interestingly, the mean response dropped significantly, with participants tending to deny that the 
mainframe caused the crash.23 This suggests that the instability is not the most salient causal 
factor in the case, which undermines the saliency objection. Third, in Study 5 we rewrote the 
vignette to make the instability a feature rather than a bug. We specified that the company’s 
mainframe is running an operating system that is designed to support only a single user at a time. 
Once again participants tended to deny that Lauren caused the crash and to affirm that Jane 
caused the crash.24 We replicated Study 5 using a between-participants design in Study 6.25 The 
results of these studies are shown in Figure 4. Taken together, they provide strong evidence that 
the instability of the computer system is not driving participants’ responses with regard to Lauren 
and Jane. 
                                                 
22 N=54; 76.9% female, average age 38.8, ranging from 18-75. Lauren: mean=1.54, sd=1.16, t=-15.59, p<2.2e-16. 
Jane: mean=4.98, sd=2.29, t=3.14, p=0.00137. Mainframe: mean=5.24, sd=2.05, t=4.46, p=2.18e-5. 
23 N=47; 66.0% female, average age 35.3, ranging from 18-61. Mainframe: mean=3.17, sd=2.01, t=-2.82, 
p=0.00699, two-tailed. Compared to corresponding question in Study 3: t(97.483)=-5.12, p=1.57e-6. 
24 N=52; 75.5% female, average age 37.4, ranging from 18-74. Lauren: mean=2.08, sd=1.83,  
t=-7.56, p=3.59e-10. Jane: mean=5.44, sd=2.11, t=4.93, p=4.53e-6. 
25 N=36, 35; 70.4% female, average age 35.2, ranging from 18-74. Lauren: mean=1.72, sd=1.37, t=-10.01, p=4.11e-
12. Jane: mean=4.86, sd=2.38, t=2.1323, p=0.0201. 
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Figure 4: Results for Studies 3–6.  
 
 
3.3 Objection 3: Blame Validation 
One might argue that participants’ reports do not reflect their (correct) causal intuitions. Perhaps 
people think that Jane deserves to be blamed (having violated company policy) but that Lauren 
should not be blamed (having followed the policy). In order to validate their blame judgments, 
people say that Jane but not Lauren caused the system to crash despite having the intuition that 
both Lauren and Jane caused the system to crash.26 If so, it could be argued that their causal 
attributions are biased and should not constrain theorizing about actual causation. 
                                                 
26 See Alicke (1992) and Alicke, Rose, and Bloom (2011) for a suggestion of this type; see Sytsma and Livengood 
(ms) for a response.  
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 To test the blame validation objection, we carried out six further studies. In Study 7, we 
gave participants slightly different statements to evaluate after the original Lauren and Jane 
vignette. Instead of asking about the agents themselves, we asked participants to state their level 
of agreement with the following statements designed to emphasize the agents’ actions: 
 1. Lauren’s action of logging into the terminal caused the system to crash. 
 2. Jane’s action of logging into the terminal caused the system to crash.  
If participants’ responses were being biased by blame judgments, we should be able to reduce or 
eliminate the effect by drawing attention away from the agents. However, participants denied 
that Lauren’s action caused the crash and asserted that Jane’s action caused the crash.27 We 
replicated Study 7 using a between-participants design in Study 8.28 
 Perhaps focusing attention on the actions rather than the actors is inadequate. A more 
direct approach is to remove permissibility information from the Lauren and Jane scenario. 
Without permissibility information, the desire to blame should not bias ordinary causal 
attributions. What do the three theories we are considering predict for this case? Following the 
same logic articulated in Section 2, each of the theories would make the same predictions as they 
did for the original Lauren and Jane case.  
In Study 9 we removed all information about the company’s log-in policy from the 
Lauren and Jane scenario. Unlike in our previous studies, in this study participants treated 
Lauren and Jane equivalently; but contra the theories under consideration, our participants 
                                                 
27 N=48; 66.7% female, average age 32.8, ranging from 18-59. Lauren: mean=2.52, sd=2.06, t=-4.97, p=4.68e-6. 
Jane: mean=5.56, sd=2.08, t=5.20, p=2.14e-6. 
28 N=43, 34; 68.8% female, average age 32.8, ranging from 18-64. Lauren: mean=2.51, sd=1.94, t=-5.02, p=4.99e-6. 
Jane: mean=4.97, sd=2.18, t=2.59, p=0.0007. 
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tended to say that neither Lauren nor Jane caused the system to crash.29 This study was 
replicated in Study 10 using a between-participants design.30 
 Finally, in Study 11 we combined the previous two approaches, giving participants a 
vignette with no permissibility information together with statements emphasizing actions as 
opposed to agents. Consistent with the previous results, participants denied both that Lauren’s 
action caused the crash and that Jane’s action caused the crash.31 We replicated Study 11 using a 
between-participants design in Study 12. The results for Studies 7–12 are shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5: Results for Studies 7–12. 
                                                 
29 N=71; 70.0% female, average age 35.1, ranging from 18-64. Lauren: mean=2.70, sd=2.14, t=-5.10, p=1.39e-6. 
Responses for Jane were identical to those for Lauren. 
30 N=39, 39; 66.7% female, average age 39.3, ranging from 18-71. Lauren: mean=2.36, sd=1.56, t=-6.5518,  
p=5.00e-8. Jane: mean=2.10, sd=1.67, t=-7.1085, p=8.77e-9. 
31 N=43; 74.4% female, average age 30.0, ranging from 18-63. Lauren: mean=3.33, sd=2.31, t=-1.92, p=0.031. 
Responses for Jane were identical to those for Lauren. 
 21 
4. Revisiting the Defaults and Norms 
In Section 3, we responded to some attempts to defend both structural and DTN theories of 
actual causation from the criticism that they fail to satisfy the FAD in some simple cases. In this 
section we consider some defenses that are specific to DTN theories. 
 
4.1 Solution 1: Focus on Permissibility 
Let’s focus on Hitchcock’s theory for a moment. Hitchcock’s theory fails to satisfy the FAD for 
the original Lauren and Jane case at least in part because the rules of thumb for assigning default 
and deviant values say nothing about prescriptive norms. Many studies have shown that ordinary 
causal attributions are sensitive to such norms (e.g., Alicke, 1992; Hitchcock and Knobe, 2009; 
Alicke et al., 2011; Sytsma, Livengood, and Rose, 2012). Since the Lauren and Jane case 
includes information about prescriptive norms, it is not completely surprising that Hitchcock’s 
theory fails to satisfy the FAD with respect to it. 
Is there a way to call on Hitchcock’s rules of thumb to arrive at default and deviant 
values that take permissibility information into account? Allowing ourselves the benefit of 
hindsight, we could call on the thought that “we typically feel that deviant outcomes are in need 
of explanation” (2007a, 507), and argue that Jane’s action—but not Lauren’s—stands in need of 
explanation. Following this line of thought, we should treat the default value for Jane as being 
“does not log in” because Jane’s logging in stands in need of explanation. Hence, Jane remains a 
cause. But what about Lauren? Having focused on the impermissibility of Jane’s behavior, we 
might similarly focus on the permissibility of Lauren’s behavior. We might assign Lauren the 
default value of “logs in” because her action does not call out for explanation. After all, she does 
not violate any company policy by logging in. In this way, Hitchcock’s theory can be made to 
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generate causal attributions that agree with the results from Study 1: Jane is said to be an actual 
cause of the system crashing, while Lauren is not. And a similar move can be made for Halpern 
and Hitchcock’s theory.   
By adjusting the defaults (or the normality rankings), the DTN theories can capture the 
asymmetry between the responses for Lauren and the responses for Jane. But, it should be noted 
that we could explain the asymmetry in two different ways: either the causal ratings for Jane are 
elevated relative to the causal ratings for Lauren, or the causal ratings for Lauren are depressed 
relative to the causal ratings for Jane. And these two explanations generate very different 
predictions for what we will find when we remove the permissibility information from the 
Lauren and Jane vignette. If the elevated explanation is correct, then people should tend to say 
that neither Lauren nor Jane caused the system to crash. And if the depressed explanation is 
correct, then people should tend to say that both Lauren and Jane caused the system to crash. 
 Using permissibility as a way to bring the predictions for the DTN theories in line with 
folk causal attributions for the original Lauren and Jane case aligns the theories with the Lauren 
depressed explanation. As such, the theories predict that if we remove permissibility information 
from the Lauren and Jane scenario, people will say both that Lauren caused the system to crash 
and that Jane caused the system to crash.32 But we saw in Study 9 that when permissibility 
information is removed, participants tend to say that neither Lauren nor Jane caused the system 
to crash—a finding that was further supported by the remaining studies in Section 4. It appears, 
                                                 
32 Hitchcock’s theory was able to satisfy the FAD for the original case by treating the impermissibility of Jane’s 
action as shifting the default value for Lauren from “does not log in” to “logs in.” In the absence of permissibility 
information, however, no shift would occur. Hence, without permissibility information, our initial verdict follows 
from Hitchcock’s rules of thumb. Not logging into the computer system is a self-sustaining absence. Logging into 
the system is a temporary action that requires voluntary bodily motion. Using the default value of “does not log in” 
for both Lauren and Jane, Hitchcock’s theory again asserts that both are actual causes of the system crashing. 
Similarly, Halpern and Hitchcock’s theory predicts that people will tend to say that both Lauren and Jane caused the 
system to crash when no permissibility information is given, provided they judge worlds in which Lauren (or Jane) 
logs in to be no more normal than worlds in which she does not log in. 
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then, that the Jane elevated explanation is the correct one. Thus, not only do the theories fail to 
satisfy the FAD for the Lauren and Jane case when permissibility information is removed, but 
insofar as they are able to satisfy the FAD for the original Lauren and Jane case, they get the 
causal attributions right for the wrong reason: they depress Lauren rather than elevating Jane. 
 
4.2 Solution 2: Revisiting the Saliency of the Instability 
Perhaps a variation on the objection from 3.2 would allow the DTN theories to handle cases 
where permissibility information is removed. Specifically, one might argue that ordinary people 
take the instability of the system to be in need of explanation, while the actions of Lauren and 
Jane are not. If so, then further modification of the default values or the normality rankings might 
enable the DTN theories to also satisfy the FAD for cases without permissibility information.  
For Hitchcock’s theory, the idea would be to focus on the rule that “we typically feel that 
deviant outcomes are in need of explanation.” If only the instability of the computer system calls 
for explanation, we can set the default values for Lauren and Jane to be “logs in,” and the default 
value for the computer system to be “stable.” With those defaults, Hitchcock’s theory correctly 
predicts folk responses to the Lauren and Jane case without permissibility information. A similar 
story will patch Halpern and Hitchcock’s theory.  
Hitchcock and Knobe (2009) distinguish between three types of norms. So far we have 
focused on statistical norms and prescriptive norms, but there are also norms of proper 
functioning. Halpern and Hitchcock also discuss norms of proper functioning, writing: 
There are specific ways that human hearts and car engines are ‘supposed’ to work, where 
‘supposed’ here has not merely an epistemic force, but a kind of normative force. Of 
course, a car engine that does not work properly is not guilty of a moral wrong, but there 
is nonetheless a sense in which it fails to live up to a certain kind of standard. (430) 
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With regard to the Lauren and Jane without permissibility information scenario, it might then be 
urged that the most salient norm violation is that the instability of the mainframe violates a norm 
of proper functioning: mainframes are not supposed to crash when more than one person logs in. 
Relative to this abnormality, it might then be thought that Lauren and Jane logging in is 
comparably normal—perhaps to the point of overshadowing that the relevant comparison is 
between their logging in and their not logging in, leading people to judge that worlds in which 
Lauren/Jane log in are more normal than worlds in which they don’t. Using these normality 
judgments, Halpern and Hitchcock’s theory correctly predicts folk responses in the Lauren and 
Jane case when no permissibility information is provided. 
 The instability explanation solution fits well with what we find when we add a question 
about the mainframe to the probe used in Study 9. As predicted by the revised theories, in Study 
13 we found that participants disagreed with both the statement that Lauren caused the crash and 
the statement that Jane caused the crash, but that they agreed with the statement that that the 
mainframe caused the crash.33 We replicated this study using a between-participants design in 
Study 14.34 
 Recall that in 3.2, we tested a variation on the Lauren and Jane scenario in which the 
operating system was described as being designed to support only a single user at a time. We 
found that this revision did not have a notable effect on participants’ responses. But what 
happens if we remove the permissibility information? Since in the new story, the mainframe is 
not behaving abnormally, people would have no reason to adopt the default values or normality 
rankings suggested for the version in which the system is behaving abnormally. Hence, both 
                                                 
33 N=62; 67.7% female, average age 35.1, ranging from 18-80. Lauren: mean=2.74, sd=1.87, t=-5.29, p=8.74e-7. 
Jane: mean=2.56, sd=1.76, t=-6.42, p=1.15e-8. Mainframe: mean=6.44, sd=1.03, t=18.54, p<2.2e-16. 
34 N=40, 47, 40; 70.9% female, average age 35.7, ranging from 18-80. Lauren: mean=1.95, sd=1.48, t=-8.74, 
p=5.08e-11. Jane: mean=2.38, sd=1.69, t=-6.57, p=2.04e-8. Mainframe: mean=4.85, sd=1.93, t=2.79, p=0.0041.  
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theories should again maintain that Lauren and Jane both caused the crash. We tested this in 
Study 15. Contrary to the predictions, participants tended to deny both that Lauren caused the 
system to crash and that Jane caused the system to crash.35 We replicated this study using a 
between-participants design in Study 16.36 The results are shown in Figure 6.  
 
 
Figure 6: Results for Studies 13–16.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 N=66; 66.7% female, average age 37.1, ranging from 18-65. Lauren: mean=3.18, sd=2.24, t=-2.97, p=0.00209. 
Jane: mean=3.23, sd=2.21, t=-2.84, p=0.00301. 
36 N=40, 33; 65.8% female, average age 31.8, ranging from 18-58. Lauren: mean=3.05, sd=2.29, t=-2.63, 
p=0.00611. Jane: mean=2.36, sd=1.87, t=-5.03, p=9.03e-6. 
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4.3 Solution 3: Focus on Typicality 
In the previous two sub-sections we attempted to patch up the DTN accounts by focusing on two 
different types of norms—prescriptive norms in 4.1 and norms of proper functioning in 4.2—and 
while we made some progress in each case, the accounts still fail to satisfy the FAD for one of 
the variations on the Lauren and Jane case. Perhaps this can be rectified by calling on the third 
type of norm described by Hitchcock and Knobe (2009)—statistical norms. 
 Recall that in Section 2 we argued that because the Lauren and Jane story does not 
specify that Lauren typically logs in, and since we might expect that logging in is more the 
exception than the rule for her, her logging in is no more normal than her not logging in. 
However, one might argue that in the absence of other information about Lauren’s job, people 
will assume that logging into the mainframe is a typical part of her work day. And the same 
could be argued for Jane in the cases where no permissibility information is given. If this is 
accurate, then Halpern and Hitchcock’s theory would correctly predict that people will tend to 
deny that either Lauren or Jane caused the system to crash when they do not violate a company 
policy by logging in. Now, it might be responded that this is a stretch, especially when it comes 
to our last two studies: in Studies 15 and 16, the mainframe is described as being designed to 
support only a single user, such that it would seem highly doubtful that it would be both typical 
for Lauren to log in and typical for Jane to log in. That would, obviously, produce an unworkable 
situation. 
 However, we can test the objection more directly. In Sytsma, Livengood, and Rose 
(2012) we argued that there are two types of typicality that need to be considered when testing 
the effects of statistical norms on folk causal attributions—what is typical for an agent (agent-
level typicality) and what is typical for members of the relevant population to which that agent 
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belongs (population-level typicality).37 In Study 17, we tested the role of both types of typicality 
on a further variation on the Lauren and Jane without permissibility information scenario. To 
simplify matters, we removed Jane from the story and specified that the system would crash if 
anyone logged in. Lauren was then said to log in, and that the system crashed. On a second page, 
participants were then given a follow-up vignette in which permissibility information was 
added.38  
We ran five variations on this case. In the first variation, no typicality information was 
given. In the remaining four variations, Lauren’s action was described as either agent-level 
typical, agent-level atypical, population-level typical, or population-level atypical respectively. 
Across these probes, we found that providing typicality information had no relevant effect: in 
each case participants tended to deny that Lauren caused the system to crash on the first page (no 
permissibility information) and to affirm that she caused the system to crash on the second page 
(permissibility information added).39 The results are shown in Figure 7. 
 
                                                 
37 Halpern and Hitchcock acknowledge this distinction in laying out their account (2015, 432). 
38 Participants were not able to change their response to the question on the first page. 
39 N=61, 50, 58, 45, 55; 78.8% female, average age 37.6, ranging from 18-77. Without typicality information: first 
page (mean=2.70, sd=2.02, t=5.01, p=2.56e-6); second page (mean=5.56, sd=1.85, t(60)=6.58, p=6.49e-9). Agent-
level typical: mean=2.36, sd=1.80, t=-6.43, p=2.56e-8; mean=5.92, sd=1.85, t=7.34, p=9.91e-10. Agent-level atypical: 
mean=2.93, sd=2.07, t=-3.94, p=0.000114; mean=5.72, sd=1.90, t=6.91, p=2.21e-9. Population-level typical: 
mean=2.89, sd=6.02, t=-3.32, p=0.000921; mean=6.02, sd=1.89, t=7.18, p=3.1e-9. Population-level atypical: 
mean=2.96, sd=2.20, t=-3.49, p=0.000485; mean=5.82, sd=1.85, t=7.30, p=6.68e-10. 
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Figure 7: Results for Study 17.   
 
5. Revising the DTN Accounts 
DTN accounts have generally adopted a broad view of the normative factors involved in folk 
causal attributions. For instance, we’ve seen that Halpern and Hitchcock (2015) note three types 
of norms that they expect to be involved in normality judgments, including both statistical norms 
and prescriptive norms. In the previous section, however, we saw that statistical norms did not 
have a notable impact on folk causal attributions for the Lauren alone case. And this finding is in 
keeping with the results reported in Sytsma, Livengood, and Rose (2012).  
Noting this, one might try slightly revising Halpern and Hitchcock’s account to satisfy 
the FAD for the variations on the Lauren and Jane case we have considered by letting statistical 
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norms do significantly less work in the account, either by removing talk of statistical norms 
entirely (since in the cases we’ve considered, statistical norms do not seem to matter for ordinary 
causal attributions) or by significantly altering the role of statistical norms in the account.40 (A 
comparable move could be made with regard to determining default values for Hitchcock’s 
theory.) Generalizing across the studies we’ve looked at in this article, Halpern and Hitchcock’s 
theory runs into trouble with regard to satisfying the FAD in those situations where a prescriptive 
norm doesn’t apply. And the reason is that when there isn’t a prescriptive norm to call on, we’ve 
defaulted to calling on statistical norms that do not seem to matter to ordinary people. 
                                                 
40 This does not mean that statistical norms should be ignored completely. Rather, we hold that what effects 
statistical norms have on folk causal attributions about agents occur by affecting judgments about prescriptive 
norms, which are already captured in the account. See Sytsma, Livengood, and Rose (2012) for discussion. That 
said, one might think that there is good reason to believe that statistical norms play an independent role in some folk 
causal attributions. An anonymous referee suggested two such reasons. First, it might be urged that obviously people 
do not hold non-agents responsible, such that statistical norms must play a role in folk causal attributions concerning 
non-agents that is independent of statistical norms. Here it should be noted that our focus in this paper is on 
understanding folk causal attributions with regard to agents, and the factors involved in attributions concerning non-
agents might differ from those involved in attributions concerning agents. That said, we do not believe that it is 
obvious that people do not hold non-agents responsible. In our opinion this is an open empirical question that stands 
in need of testing. We tentatively hold, however, that our account will also cover folk causal attributions concerning 
non-agents. This expectation is based in part on preliminary testing indicating that responsibility judgments play a 
role in folk causal attributions. Further, background empirical work suggests that people tend to take an agentive 
perspective on nature as a whole (see e.g., Bloom, 2007; Kelemen, 2012; Rose, 2015; Rose and Schaffer, 2015), 
providing reason to expect that people will hold non-agents responsible. Second, it might be argued that the fourth 
experiment in Kominsky et al. (2015) provides empirical evidence suggesting that statistical norms play an 
independent role in folk causal attributions. In this study participants were presented with a scenario where Alex 
plays a game that involves both flipping a coin and rolling a pair of dice. In the relevant cases, for Alex to win he 
both needs to get a heads on the coin flip and get at least a certain number on the sum of the dice. In one case the 
sum needed is likely to occur (higher than 2) and in the other it is unlikely to occur (higher than 11). In each case 
Alex wins and participants are asked how strongly they agree or disagree with the statement, “Alex won because of 
the coin flip.” Kominsky et al. found that participants gave significantly higher answers in the case where Alex only 
needed to roll higher than 2 than in the case where he needed to roll higher than 11. This is a fascinating result. It is 
unclear that it provides evidence for the role of statistical norms in folk causal attributions, however, because it is 
unclear that we should take agreement/disagreement with the statement “Alex won because of the coin flip” as 
indicating agreement/disagreement with a corresponding causal statement such as “the coin flip caused Alex to 
win.” See Livengood and Machery (2007) for evidence that “X caused Y” and “Y because X” statements sometimes 
come apart. Further, we have tested this contrast for the first variation of the Lauren scenario used in Study 17. We 
asked participants whether “the system crashed because Lauren logged in” (as opposed to “Lauren caused the 
system to crash”). We found that judgments were significantly higher for the “because” statement than they were for 
the “caused” statement in Study 17:  N=60, 70.0% female, average age 37.9, ranging from 18-71; mean=4.03, 
sd=2.48 (contrasted to 2.70, 2.02); t=-3.23, p=0.001645, two-tailed. It may also be the case that causal attributions 
are sensitive to certain varieties of statistical norm but not others. If so, then perhaps there is a salient difference 
between the statistical norms at play in the cases we’ve considered and the statistical norms at play in Kominsky et 
al.’s case. Further research on the role of statistical norms in causal attributions about cases like the one given by 
Kominsky et al. is called for and is currently underway. 
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This raises an important question: What considerations should guide normality judgments 
when the prescriptive norms allow an agent to either act or to refrain? Our suggestion follows 
from the responsibility view—i.e., the view that folk causal attributions are inherently normative 
and are closely related to responsibility judgments. With regard to assessing responsibility for a 
bad outcome (like the system crashing in the Lauren and Jane case), we expect that people tend 
to treat it as normal for the agent to do what they are allowed to do. The idea, here, is that it is 
acceptable for the agent to do what the prescriptive norms allow them to do, and because of this 
we shouldn’t hold it against them if they thereby unwittingly bring about a bad outcome. If this is 
correct, then on the hypothesis that folk causal attributions correspond with responsibility 
judgments, we expect the same rule of thumb to work for arriving at normality judgments for 
purposes of predicting folk causal attributions.  
Focusing on prescriptive norms and utilizing the rule of thumb given above, the DTN 
accounts we’ve been considering produce the correct predictions for each of the variations on the 
Lauren and Jane case we have looked at. Focusing on Halpern and Hitchcock’s theory as applied 
to the original Lauren and Jane scenario, we see that Jane acts abnormally in logging in because 
she is prohibited from doing so, while Lauren acts normally in logging in because she is allowed 
to do so. And the result is that Halpern and Hitchcock’s theory then correctly outputs the 
prediction that people will tend to say that Jane caused the system to crash and that Lauren did 
not cause the system to crash. Similarly for the cases where permissibility information is 
removed. In these cases our rule of thumb leads us to judge that both Lauren and Jane act 
normally in logging in because they are allowed to do so, which produces the correct prediction 
that people will tend to say that neither of them caused the system to crash. 
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6. Conclusion 
Knobe’s (2006) Lauren and Jane case raises a serious problem for three prominent theories of 
actual causation. In opposition to the causal attributions delivered by these theories, participants 
tend to disagree with the statement that Lauren caused the system to crash. A range of follow-up 
studies testing various objections confirms the basic finding. And while the accounts calling on 
defaults, typicality, or normality can be patched-up to handle the original scenario, the resulting 
theories have problems with variations in which permissibility information is removed. The result 
is that the theories fail to satisfy the FAD and are in need of revision. We hold that the problem is 
that these theories place weight on statistical norms in addition to prescriptive norms, and that the 
most straightforward revision is to remove statistical norms from the account and replace them 
with additional guidance for navigating prescriptive norms. With such a revision, both Hitchcock’s 
(2007a) theory and Halpern and Hitchcock’s (2015) theory are able to satisfy the FAD for the 
cases we have considered. 
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